WordPress Online Store local file inclusion vulnerability

Advisory

Secunia Advisory SA50836

Analysis of vulnerability

The WP Online Store exposes a shortcode for displaying the store, which is declared in core.php:

If the “slug” request parameter isn’t defined, it will load the index page of the store. But if it is defined, it will load the relevant page which the user requests. It however does not sanitize that the “slug” is a WP Online Store file, which allows for a local file inclusion vulnerability if we create a post/page with the text “[WP_online_store]“, and submit a request with the slug set like this:

 

WordPress Online Store arbitrary file disclosure

Advisory

Secunia Advisory SA50836

Analysis of vulnerability

The plugin hooks two functions as a part of its core functionality in core.php by adding an action for init and admin_init.

The first line calls into osc_session_init_fend whenever a WordPress page is loaded, in order to set up a session.

The interesting thing is that on line 136 is checks the “force” request variable to see if it matches to “downloadnow”. If it is set, it will change the content type of the response to be a download, and then read the file set by the request variables “turl” and “file” and write that to the response. These variables are however not sanitized, which leads to an arbitrary file disclosure. We can exploit this by making a request to any page with following querystring, which will force the browser to download a page containing the contents of the wp-config.php file at the top of the file:

 

WP Symposium multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities

Advisory

Secunia Advisory SA50674

Analysis of groups get_user_list SQL injection vulnerability

This first vulnerability in the /ajax/symposium_groups_functions.php file makes use of the functionality for people to view the users of a group. It accepts a groupID(gid) which it inserts without validation into a query and then spits out the result, even if you are not authenticated.

Because it uses multiple line, we have to do a bit more work than the other ones. We can craft an union select which fits in and uses the rest of the query without a problem like this, and dump a list of usernames and password hashes:

Analysis of get_album_item.php SQL injection vulnerability

This SQL injection vulnerability is practically as simple as it gets. And it even makes it simple for us in get_album_item.php.

It reads in 2 variables from $_REQUEST, which can be either GET or POST parameters. That’s very handy. It then proceeds to stuff the size into the SELECT part of the query using plain concatenation without previous sanitization, and then uses the wordpress prepare method of passing in content to a query safely using a printf syntax, which is safe.

Because we have control over the SELECT part of the query, we can easily select out a single piece of data at a time, which is sufficient to dump the whole database as needed. Here we can pull out a password from the users table, for instance, using a very simple request, no authentication required:

Analysis of symposium_show_profile SQL injection vulnerability

This vulnerability relies on the way which profiles are shown in Symposium. It calls into the symposium_show_profile method in symposium_profile.php file, which finds out what ID to show information for like this, assuming you are authenticated:

Note that the last line takes the $uid variable as determined on the first block of code, and simply puts it straight into the query without any sort of input sanitation. So by creating a page with the “[symposium-profile-menu]” short-tag, we can inject into the page with a simple URL like this:

Analysis of forum updateEditDetail blind SQL injection vulnerability

This vulnerability is actually more like 2. We can see that in this standard ajax call in /ajax/symposium_forum_functions.php file that there is a total of 4 SQL queries executed, 2 updates and 2 selects. Notice that the $_POST parameters aren’t sanitized before use, yet all but the 3rd query uses concatenation to create the SQL query, which creates SQL injection conditions if you are logged in.

We can exploit it like this with an appropriate set of cookies:

 Analysis of profile addFriend blind SQL injection vulnerability

A similar lack of input validation can be seen in the /ajax/symposium_profile_functions.php file in the addFriend action handling code. It takes in an ID for a friend to add and then starts putting together some SQL like this:

Notice that it simply concatenates the $friend_to variable into the query. While this query is not used for output, we can still do a blind SQL injection if we’re logged in.

 

WordPress Floating Social Media Link Plugins Remote File Inclusion

Advisory

Secunia Advisory SA51346

Analysis
The fsml-admin.js.php and fsml-hideshow.js.php both require a get parameter to specify the path for the wp-load.php file, used to initialize the WordPress backend.
However the wpp parameter is used without validation that it does not contain a malicious input. We can thus provide an url to malicious PHP code, which will be executed by the remote host, like this:

 

WordPress Zingiri Forums arbitrary file disclosure

Advisory

Secunia Advisory SA50833

Analysis of vulnerability

The Zingiri Web Forums for WordPress writes our a header for the forum in forum.php through adding an action to wp_head.

So on each load of the WordPress blog it will call into zing_forum_header. The first call it makes it into zing_forum_output, which is rather long. I’ve highlighted two areas:

We can affect the value of $zing_forum_to_include through the zforum GET variable. This is then used in a big else if statement. Here is the block of code that is executed if we set that to css:

If we don’t set anything expect the “url” get variable, we can cause it to be fed into the file_get_contents call on line 554. We can abuse this to disclose the contents of the wp-config.php file like this:

 

WordPress Google Document Embedder arbitrary file disclosure

Advisory

Secunia Advisory SA50832

Analysis of vulnerability

Google Document Embedder offers a proxy for forcing a PDF to download rather than use the default browser handler. It implements this through /libs/pdf.php:

First it will check if allow_url_fopen is enabled. Then it checks the two variables we need to provide, the “fn”(Filename) and “file” GET parameters. If both are provided it will verify that the filename ends in .pdf. From there, it goes onto deicing how to fetch the file, and eventually call into file_get_contents by passing the file GET parameter straight into the call. Note that the filename is only used to determine the filename returned on line 45. Because it will use file_get_contents if at all possible, we can provide a local path to include. We can for instance fetch the wp-config.php file like this:

 

WordPress Duplicator plugin arbitrary file disclosure

Analysis of vulnerability

In version 0.3.0 of WordPress duplicator the file /files/installer.rescue.php and /files/installer.template.php which were added for security reasons. The file was made to download an installer file. They both start with this snippet of code::

If the “get” querystring parameter is set, it will read the file specified by the “file” querystring parameter and read that into the response as installer.php. But because this file is deployed by default to all installations and it does not sanitize the “file” variable, we can use it to read any arbitrary file by making a request like this:

 

WordPress Advanced Custom Fields remote file inclusion vulnerability

Advisory

Secunia Advisory SA 51037

Analysis of vulnerability
A Remote File Inclusion vulnerability exists in the Advanced Custom Fields plugin for WordPress. By exploiting an unsafe use of array_merge which takes user-input in /core/actions/export.php, it is possible to override a value used for an include:

By posting another value for acf_abspath to the script, we can overwrite the value which is used for the two require_once calls. For instance, we can make a request like this which will request /wp-load.php and /wp-admin/admin.php from myevilsite.com:


 

WordPress All Video Gallery Plugin SQL injection vulnerability

Advisory

Secunia Advisory SA50874

Analysis of vulnerability

The All Video Gallery Plugin has two pages, playlist.php and /xml/playlist.php, which both takes a “vid” ID and outputs the result from the query into XML format.

Note however that the “vid” GET parameter is never sanitized, which means that we can inject SQL into it and disclose information from the database by making a simple request to either of the pages like this:

 

WordPress FireStorm Professional Real Estate Plugin SQL Injection vulnerability

Advisory

Secunia Advisory SA 50873

Analysis of vulnerability

The FireStorm Professional Real Estate Plugin for WordPress offers functionality for an user to search for real estate based on a province or country. It is implemented in the file search.php:

By either providing a ProvinceID or CountryID, we can make the application pass the value into two SQL queries. Note however that in both cases, the value is taken directly from the GET parameter without sanitazion, which opens it up to a SQL injection attack where we can select arbitrary data from the database. For instance, we can select the password hash for an user like this: